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1 In 1959, William Appleman Williams published The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.  It was a
book that boldly set out to trace the contours of America’s imperial trajectory from the
late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century.  Williams’ approach to
U.S. foreign policy put him in the vanguard of what would become New Left historical
revisionism  during  the  1960s.   His  reassessment  of  American  history  which  in  part
involved his  deployment of  such concepts  as imperialism and empire  to elucidate U.S.
policies  and practices  opened a  space  for  new interpretations  of  not  only  America’s
historical past, but also its troubled present in the sixties.  “I was born and reared in our
American womb of empire,” states Williams in another book, “but my experience and my
study  of  history  have  enabled  me  to  understand  that  we  must  leave  that  imperial
incubator if we are to become citizens of the real world.  Our future is here and now, a
community  to  be  created  among ourselves  so  that  we  can be  citizens−not  imperial
overlords−of the world.”
2 While the relevance of Williams’ analyses of American imperialism are not acknowledged
in The Big Ditch there is some consolation in that Maurer and Yu rely on the work of
Walter LaFeber, one of Williams’ early disciples.  But to be fair to the authors of The Big
Ditch,  whereas Williams tended to focus on the macro-historical processes of imperial
practices, Maurer and Yu concentrate on a specific development, the Panama Canal, and
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follow its historical evolution over the period of a century.  The volume is divided into
nine  chapters,  commencing  with  Spanish  colonial  practices  in  the  sixteenth  century
moving on to the various plans, both European and American, to build an isthmian canal
in Central America in the late nineteenth century, and concluding in the late twentieth
century with the handover of the canal from the U.S.A. to the Panamanian authorities.
 Supplementing the narrative are a plethora of graphs, tables, charts, and maps which
provide the reader with helpful information largely centered on economic matters.  A key
strength of the narrative is that while there is a lot of focus on the economics of the canal,
the  reader  who  is  not  necessarily  comfortable  with  economic  analyses  will  not  feel
overwhelmed  with  the  book’s  content.   But  I  emphasize,  as  the  authors  do  in  their
introduction, that The Big Ditch is by and large a study about “the economics of American
imperialism” (2).
3 Herein lies another asset of this volume: while many studies of imperial ventures tend to
strictly focus on political or military aspects, this study utilizes a wider field in which
economic issues serve as the central pivot.  In addition, through a diachronic analysis of
the canal and the central actors (the U.S.A. and Panama) we are led to see how the canal’s
importance waxes and wanes over the subsequent decades due to changing contexts and
interests.  The turning point for the U.S.A. was the Spanish-American War of 1898 which
resulted not only in a victory for America’s military forces, but also the acquisition of
particular territories including Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines.  In geopolitical
terms, U.S. interests were moving towards the Pacific. The necessity of trimming shipping
costs for ships travelling from the eastern seaboard to the Pacific and East Asia via a
Central American canal became imperative.  While Nicaragua was the first choice for a
proposed canal route, the engineering challenges were less daunting for a route through
Colombia.  By 1902, serious negotiations with the Colombian government commenced,
but hammering out a treaty that was acceptable to both sides proved difficult.  Colombia’s
reluctance  to  acquiesce  to  America’s  designs  was,  in  President  Theodore  Roosevelt’s
mind, contemptuous and unacceptable.  In short, since the U.S. was unable to negotiate a
treaty with the Colombian government, it then proceeded to support a secessionist revolt
in that part of Colombia where the canal was to be constructed.  As Maurer and Yu point
out,  the  “revolution  was  scheduled  for  November  3,”  and  three  days  later  Panama
declared  its  independence.  (84)   To  Roosevelt’s  pleasure,  the  newly  established
Panamanian government agreed to the terms of the treaty and went even further in its
constitution  by  granting  the  U.S.  the  right  to  intervene  militarily  should  the  latter
determine it to be necessary.  The authors engage the reader in an interesting discussion
of why the U.S. did not choose the path of annexation as it did with the Philippines.  By
and large,  the most salient point is that the U.S.  created a Canal Zone carved out of
Panamanian territory in which it was able to enjoy full sovereignty without having to
contend with imperial-colonial administration of Panama proper.  Of essence for the U.S.
was having the canal and developing it into a profitable imperial enterprise.
4 The proceeding chapters examine the actual construction, cost, and management aspects
of the canal. Whereas the book’s focus thus far was mainly political, the narrative shifts
toward the realm of  economics and the canal’s  ramifications for  regional  and global
shipping interests,  as  well  as  competing modes of  transportation in the hemisphere.
 Effects on other industries are also given attention.  An interesting revelation Maurer
and  Yu  make  is  that  “the  Canal  Zone  generated  little  economic  impact  for  the
Panamanian  economy”  (201).   One  would  have  expected  a  spillover  effect  from  the
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existence of the canal in the neighborhood and an interest in foreign investment, but this
apparently did not materialize due to the both perceived and real suzerainty that the U.S.
had not only in the Canal Zone, but also in Panama itself.  Following the Second World
War, U.S. interests in the Panama Canal underwent a transformation.  The geo-strategic
concerns the U.S. had had in 1900 were not the same by mid-century; the Cold War had
altered those dynamics.  In regard to American economic interests the situation was even
worse.  “The social savings of the canal,” report Maurer and Yu, “faded under the triple
impact of the Interstate Highway System, the dieselization of railroad freight, and the
growth of the Pacific coast as a market for its own raw materials” (212), a strange case for
imperialism not paying off.  Inefficiency and poor management on the American side also
accelerated the relative decline of the canal and hastened discussion about “ditching the
ditch.”   In  spite  of  nationalist  discourses  about  keeping  the  canal,  the  Carter
Administration and the U.S. government agreed to handover the Panama Canal to the
Panamanians by the year 1999, thus bringing to an end seventy-five years of American
control  of  the  canal and  the  Canal  Zone.   Interestingly  enough,  despite  the  Noriega
episode  of  the  early  1990s,  which  included  a  substantial  U.S.  military  invasion,  the
gradual  process  of  assuming control  over  the canal  went  quite  smoothly.   Regarding
contemporary developments, the authors conclude in one of the latter chapters in their
narrative  that  the  Panamanian  authorities  have  successfully  managed  over  the  past
decade to convert the canal into a profitable commercial enterprise, something that had
eluded American management since the 1920s. It serves as an interesting example of how
the ‘colonized’ went on to surpass the abilities and expectations of the ‘colonizer.’ 
5 In sum, this volume succeeds in a number of respects.  First and foremost, it is a well
researched  and  impressively  written  narrative.   Within  this  framework  the  authors
manage to weave together a fascinating study of a great technological breakthrough, a
tale of imperial manipulation and power politics, the intricacies of political economy, and
the unexpected results of decolonization.  Through a diachronic approach that provides
the reader with a sense of the altering contexts and interests at play, Maurer and Yu
provide an instructive case study of imperialism at work and classify its benefits and costs
for both the U.S.A. and Panama.  One thing to keep in mind, however, is that the reader
should have some level of interest in economic matters.  Having noted that, The Big Ditch
strikes an interesting balance in addressing both the political and economic dimensions
of imperialism and the practices of empire, and fills a gap by providing a comprehensive
analysis of the Panama Canal through a century of its history. 
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